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Report on the outcome of a meeting on 22/04/19 with Russian military analysts in the territory

By Pierre Vaux

This is part of a tranche of internal communications from deep inside infamous caterer turned troll farmer and mercenary backer Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Libya operation, always referred to simply as “the Company.” These files were originally obtained by the Dossier Centre, a London-based investigative team funded by former Russian oligarch and political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Please see our summary in The Daily Beast.

Translator’s note: This document was written on April 22, 2019


To the manager

  1. Khalifa Haftar’s chances of taking Tripoli are assessed as nil. Between 21-22 04, the enemy has actually repelled the LNA in several areas by 10 kilometres. Recently arrived reinforcements from Misrata have entered the battle.This is confirmed by the use against the LNA of anti-tank systems, that would only have been brought to the front from Misrata.

At the same time KH has sent, according to various estimates, 60-70% of his relatively combat-ready units to the west. The LNA has no additional resources for the seizure of the capital, the siege of Sirte or to draw away the forces from Misrata. There also remains an exposed area behind the lines in the south, where an offensive by ISIS and al-Qaeda militants is expected.

The Russian military command has repeatedly asked to be familiarised with the plan to take Tripoli, but it has never been presented. Most likely, it simply doesn’t exist.

The plan to “wear down” Sarraj’s army and his allied groups has actually been turned into the attrition of the LNA itself.

  1. Evidently, the enemy is significantly outmatching the LNA in terms of preparedness, combat capability and the experience of personnel. Regardless of the enormous consumption of ammunition (there are three Il-76 flights are day, delivering Russian munitions from the UAE through Jordan, as well as deliveries from Egypt), the LNA has not had any significant military …read more

    From:: The Interpreter – Institute of Modern Russia

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